INTRODUCTION
[T]he Human Rights Commission has greater expertise than grievance arbitrators in the resolution of human rights violations. In my view, any concerns in respect of this matter are outweighed by the significant benefits associated with the availability of an accessible and informal forum for the prompt resolution of allegations of human rights violations in the workplace . . . . Moreover, expertise is not static, but, rather, is something that develops as a tribunal grapples with issues on a repeated basis. The fact that the Human Rights Commission currently has greater expertise than the [Arbitration] Board in respect of human rights violations is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a grievance arbitrator ought not to have the power to enforce the rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code.
-Iacobucci J. When I began to work in the field of labour law -not so very long ago -it was already well established that arbitrators had the power to interpret and apply both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and quasi-constitutional human rights statutes. Meiorin was hot off the presses, and labour litigators bustled off to arbitration and judicial review hearings armed with a "unified approach" to claims of employment discrimination. 2 Pleading human rights claims seemed to me to be a normal -even routine -part of labour law practice.
While taking a coffee break in the course of preparing arguments for an arbitration hearing, I spoke with a senior lawyer, who offered me some advice: "Always try to plead a
Charter question," he said, referring to the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms. "Even if you have to scratch your head to find it." I looked at him expectantly, happy to receive pearls of wisdom from a veteran of the trenches going back to the days when judicial review was fraught with questions preliminary and collateral, and ashtrays could be found on every table in an arbitration hearing. "Plead a Charter question and remember to plead it last," he continued.
"Arbitrators hate dealing with the complexity of the Charter and they'd rather find in your favour on another argument so they can avoid dealing with it."
Several years later, I recounted this story to a leading member of the Bar. "That'll only work with the older arbitrators," he commented. "The younger ones are pretty up to date on Charter stuff." He went on: "But it's still good advice. On judicial review of Charter questions, the correctness standard applies, so it gives you another kick at the can if you don't like the outcome at arbitration. Come to think of it, it might still be a good idea to plead it last. Arbitrators hate to be quashed on judicial review and they might be inclined to find for you on other grounds, so they can stay behind the protective shield of the patently unreasonable standard."
These two anecdotes frame the issues I want to discuss in this paper. First, some arbitrators don't (or at least didn't) have the expertise to deal with human rights claims, which involve a complex and evolving area of law. Second, arbitrators are beginning to acquire that expertise (or have acquired it). Third, courts don't defer to arbitrators on their interpretation of human rights legislation, as they are not perceived to have a higher level of expertise than judges do. Finally, the dynamic of expertise and standards of judicial review has very concrete effects on how actors in labour law approach disputes, to the point of strategically mobilizing those factors for short-term advantage at the long-term expense of undermining the policy touchstone of labour arbitration: speedy, accessible and informal hearings that lead to final and binding decisions which allow parties to a collective agreement to get on with the business of working together.
This leads to me to pose the following questions, which I address in this paper: (1) What exactly is tribunal expertise in the context of the law of judicial review? (2) If arbitrators can acquire expertise, should this be reflected in the law of judicial review? (3) What are the consequences of a judicial policy of reviewing arbitral awards on human rights claims according to the standard of correctness? (4) Is a more deferential approach desirable or even possible?
In Part 2, I outline how the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, have dealt with the notion of expertise. I conclude that the role played by administrative tribunal expertise in standard of review analysis is far from clear, but that the most promising approach is to deem tribunals to have expertise rather than to let judicial determination of actual expertise play an independent role in the analysis. This recognizes the importance of expertise to a general theory of judicial review without requiring judges to embark on a methodologically suspect extrastatutory search for evidence of it. I then argue in Part 3 that labour arbitrators do in any event have significant expertise in interpreting human rights statutes in the context of the employment relationship, and that courts should therefore show deference to their interpretations. This deference can be justified, in part, by applying the kind of deeming logic set out in the first part.
Finally, in Part 4, I address some potential objections to granting arbitrators deference on judicial review.
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE AND ITS ROLE IN DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE
Though an administrative tribunal's expertise is an important factor in determining the applicable standard of review, 3 the Supreme Court has had little to say about exactly what expertise is, 4 and it is not clear how it should be taken into account as an independent criterion in determining the standard of review.
A small but detailed body of commentary has simultaneously decried the paucity of the Court's analysis of tribunal expertise and offered two helpful conceptual distinctions that can serve to guide a coherent and realistic understanding of the role of expertise in judicial review. 5 consider in settling on a standard of review" at para 50); see also Finally, experience -the repeated grappling with similar questions -can contribute both to individual and institutional expertise.
12
The second helpful distinction is between a tribunal's expertise and its specialized role in the administration of a statutory scheme or regulatory regime. 13 A tribunal may be specialized, in the sense that that it has an exclusive but limited jurisdiction over a domain of activity, without its members being experts in that domain.
14 Though these distinctions are analytically important, it is difficult to see how they could be taken into account in the judicial determination of expertise in the context of standard of review analysis, as that analysis is currently understood in the jurisprudence. Whether a decision was rendered by an expert is an empirical question, and yet the courts do not base their determination of expertise on evidence. 15 R.E. Hawkins explains:
[W]hile it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended specialized tasks to be performed by expert tribunals, whether the tribunal performing the task is expert or not is an empirical matter. Legislatures do not usually write job descriptions for tribunal members, or define in detail how they are to be chosen, or choose them, or train them, or require them to collect precedents, or evaluate their performance. Legislation may envisage that a specialized tribunal will be established: the reality may be something else.
16
One response to this would be for courts to hear evidence on the actual expertise of the adjudicator who rendered the decision under review, or on the tribunal as an institution, or on In British Columbia, this approach has been codified in the Administrative Tribunals Act:
"If the tribunal's enabling Act contains a privative clause, relative to the courts the tribunal must be considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction." 29 This bald statutory conflation of expertise and jurisdiction may share a serious flaw with the deeming approach to expertise apparently adopted by the Supreme Court: vacuity.
If expertise is determined by reference to the specialized role of the tribunal and the existence of a privative clause, then it would appear to have no independent role to play in the standard of review analysis, since those two factors are already supposed to have been taken into account.
Recall that expertise is only one of the four factors to consider in determining the level of deference that courts ought to show toward administrative tribunals. The other factors are the existence of a privative clause, the purpose of the statute, and the nature of the question. 30 From the outset, it was understood that the purpose of the statute was intimately tied to the question of expertise; indeed, "purpose and expertise often overlap." 31 But if both examination of the privative clause and the "purpose of the statute" analysis are used in determining expertise, then it is unclear how expertise can be a separate category. One could reply that the factors "must be Expertise should either be taken into account or should not be. But it makes no sense to claim both that expertise is a factor in determining the standard of review and that expertise is only ascertained by analyzing other factors.
For all the supposed clarity that was brought to the law of judicial review by the Supreme Court's decision in Dunsmuir, 34 the method that the Court applied in determining expertise remains a mystery. The majority in Dunsmuir summed up as follows the notion of deference that underlies the reasonableness standard of review:
In short, deference requires respect for the legislative choices to leave some matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, for the processes and determinations that draw on particular expertise and experiences, and for the different roles of the courts and administrative bodies within the Canadian constitutional system.
35
Despite the shift in language and the reduction in the number of available standards of review, the majority in Dunsmuir proposed that the appropriate level of deference be determined by using the familiar Pushpanathan factors, including expertise.
36
Two years later, in Khosa, 37 Justice Rothstein identified the problem of the unclear relationship between expertise and the legislative grant of jurisdiction backed by a privative clause. In his concurring opinion, he described the law of judicial review as having two sources:
interpretation of the enabling statute and in particular its privative clause, and a "common law" 38 Use of this term is problematic, given that it refers to the general public law of Canada rather than the jurisprudence-based private law in force in provinces outside of Quebec. The majority occasionally uses the more suitable expression "general law of judicial review" (see Khosa, supra note 18 at para 33).
the constitution. 39 Justice Rothstein decried the conceptual confusion that arises from conflating these two sources. In particular, he argued that the "common law" of judicial review ought not to have introduced expertise as a free-standing basis for deference. 40 Rather, expertise should only be understood as a ground for deference insofar as it is "signalled" by the legislature's enactment of a strong privative clause:
Far from subscribing to the view that courts should be reviewing the actual expertise of administrative decision makers, it is my position that this is the function of the legislature. In my view, the discordance between imputed versus actual expertise is simply one manifestation of the larger conceptual unhinging of tribunal expertise from the privative clause. The legislatures that create administrative decision makers are better able to consider the relative qualifications, specialization and day-to-day workings of tribunals, boards and other decision makers which they themselves have constituted. Where the legislature believes that an administrative decision maker possesses superior expertise on questions that are normally within the traditional bailiwick of courts (law, jurisdiction, fraud, natural justice, etc.), it can express this by enacting a privative clause.
41
Though there is certainly room to criticize Justice Rothstein's opinion (on the basis, for instance, that it unduly restricts the grounds on which courts can review administrative decisions, 42 or fails to recognize that privative clauses may address issues unrelated to expertise, such as expediency and cost), it has the advantage of adding conceptual clarity. In the following section, I argue that the same deeming logic can be applied to ground a finding that labour arbitrators are sufficiently expert in human rights law in the employment context to merit deference from the courts on judicial review. Arbitrators' jurisdiction was further expanded to include the power not only to interpret and apply collective agreements in conformity with human rights legislation but to apply that legislation directly, even in the absence of a specific clause in the collective agreement. In Weber, arbitral jurisdiction was found to extend to any dispute that "in its essential character, arises from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of the collective agreement"; 55 "essential character" was to be determined "on the basis of the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties, not on the basis of the legal issues which may be framed." 56 The Court in
THE EXPERTISE OF LABOUR ARBITRATORS
Weber also said that the arbitrator's jurisdiction over such disputes was exclusive, a position that was later nuanced to allow for concurrent jurisdiction between human rights tribunals and arbitrators in some circumstances. There are, as well, clear advantages for the decision-making process in allowing the simple, speedy, and inexpensive processes of arbitration and administrative agencies to sift the facts and compile a record for the benefit of a reviewing court. It is important, in this as in other issues, to have the advantage of the expertise of the arbitrator or agency.
That specialized competence can be of invaluable assistance in constitutional interpretation.
61
Justice Iacobucci adopted a similar line of reasoning in Parry Sound:
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, the prompt, final and binding resolution of workplace disputes is of fundamental importance, both to the parties and to society as a whole . . . . It is essential that there exist a means of providing speedy decisions by experts in the field who are sensitive to the workplace environment, and which can be considered by both sides to be final and binding.
62
This overview of the expansion of labour arbitrators' jurisdiction shows how they came to have the power to interpret and apply human rights statutes, including the Canadian Charter, and that judicial recognition of this power was predicated in part on an assessment of arbitrators' expertise. Nonetheless, the same jurisprudence that recognized arbitrators' jurisdiction over human rights claims also limited any deference that might be shown toward arbitrators upon judicial review of their decisions on such claims. As we will see in the next section, courts have the Charter, the same concern arose with respect to administrative tribunal decisions that might have the effect of striking down legislation for non-compliance with the Charter. That concern was dealt with in these terms by Justice La Forest in Cuddy Chicks:
It must be emphasized that the process of Charter decision making is not confined to abstract ruminations on constitutional theory. In the case of Charter matters which arise in a particular regulatory context, the ability of the decision maker to analyze competing policy concerns is critical. Therefore, while Board members need not have formal legal training, it remains that they have a very meaningful role to play in the resolution of constitutional issues. The informed view of the Board, as manifested in a sensitivity to relevant facts and an ability to compile a cogent record, is also of invaluable assistance. . . .
That having been said, the jurisdiction of the Board is limited in at least one crucial respect: it can expect no curial deference with respect to constitutional decisions.
. . .
At the end of the day, the legal process will be better served where the Board makes an initial determination of the jurisdictional issue arising from a constitutional challenge. 64 Thus, the recognition of administrative tribunals' jurisdiction over constitutional claims was from the outset accompanied by an assertion of judicial supremacy: the standard of review was to be that of correctness. Indeed, one of the policy reasons cited in both Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks for recognizing the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals over Charter claims is 63 See Crevier, supra note 39 at para 19; Quebec (AG) v Farrah, [1978] 2 SCR 638 at paras 11-13, 34 (sub nom Farrah v Quebec (AG)), 86 DLR (3d) 161. 64 Supra note 54 at paras 16-17, 19. that they can make "initial" determinations and compile a record of the facts that will be useful to reviewing courts. The unstated assumption here is that constitutional determinations are bound to be reviewed by a superior court, which leaves the distinct impression that administrative tribunals are seen as mere "fact-sifters," who decide what happened before the ordinary courts do the real job of legal analysis. As a colleague of mine -a professor of constitutional law -has put it: "Administrative tribunals are certainly free to give their opinions on constitutional law, but they do so at their own risk since it will always be the courts who decide." There is, however, still a difference between "fundamental legal questions" and constitutional ones: while decisions on constitutional questions are always to be reviewed on the correctness standard (because of the "unique role of section 96 courts as interpreters of the Constitution" 70 ), "fundamental legal questions" must be both "of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area of expertise" 71 for the correctness standard to apply. This raises the question of whether it is possible for grievance arbitrators to be considered experts on human rights claims that arise in the employment context.
In particular, we can ask whether arbitrators might acquire such expertise, as the Supreme Court claimed they could in Parry Sound.
72
[1999] RJQ 1883 at para 34 (an arbitrator's interpretation of the Quebec Charter could be shown deference if it did not play a "preponderant role" in the outcome). 69 See City of Toronto, supra note 48, LeBel J concurring ("constitutional and human rights questions and those involving civil liberties, as well as other questions that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole . . . typically fall to be decided on a correctness standard" at para 67); Dunsmuir, supra note 5 ("courts must also continue to substitute their own view of the correct answer where the question at issue is one of general law 'that is both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area of expertise' " at para 60 [A] human rights tribunal does not appear to me to call for the same level of deference as a labour arbitrator. A labour arbitrator operates, under legislation, in a narrowly restricted field, and is selected by the parties to arbitrate a difference between them under a collective agreement the parties have voluntarily entered. As well, the arbitrator's jurisdiction under the statute extends to the determination of whether a matter is arbitrable. This is entirely different from the situation of a human rights tribunal, whose decision is imposed on the parties and has direct influence on society at large in relation to basic social values. The superior expertise of a human rights tribunal relates to fact-finding and adjudication in a human rights context. It does not extend to general questions of law such as the one at issue in this case.
75
Certainly, this view of labour arbitration in Mossop is one of an essentially consensual form of private ordering, concerned primarily (or perhaps exclusively) with the application of collective agreements. This is not surprising, since Mossop was rendered before Weber and long before Parry Sound. 76 Nevertheless, there is something to be said for the distinction that Justice La Forest made in the above passage. Whether they are interpreting the "bread and butter" terms of a collective agreement, such as seniority clauses, overtime provisions and workplace discipline, or statutory provisions on human rights, employment standards and the like, arbitrators are experts in the milieu of employment -in what Justice La Forest termed "a narrowly restricted field." In this respect, they are different from human rights tribunals, which apply human rights statutes in a multitude of contexts. Indeed, given the broad jurisdiction of human rights tribunals, perhaps the only thing that can be said to be common to the multiple contexts in relation to which they render decisions is that all of those contexts give rise to human rights claims. Any legal expertise that the tribunals might have is thus necessarily limited to the interpretation of human rights statutes -and, following Justice La Forest's reasoning, that is precisely the domain in which courts are considered to be experts. Thus, even if the courts were to recognize arbitrators' expertise in interpreting human rights statutes in the employment context, 75 Mossop, supra note 67 at para 45 (La Forest J's opinion in Mossop was a concurring one, but the majority explicitly endorsed his reasoning on the standard of review). See also Cooper, supra note 74 at para 61; Ross, supra note 74 at para 24. In so far as La Forest J's phrase "questions of this kind" refers to substantive human rights law (such as the scope of "family status" protection at issue in Mossop) rather than general statutory interpretation that is not of central importance to the legal system, I submit that this passage still represents the view of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Mowat, supra note 69 at paras 20-27. 76 Note, however, that Cooper, supra note 74, and Ross, supra note 74, confirmed the distinction between arbitral expertise and human rights commission expertise. These decisions were rendered after the Supreme Court had determined that arbitrators had the jurisdiction to apply human rights legislation.
this would not undermine the courts' claim to supremacy in the field of general statutory interpretation.
To be clear, I am not arguing that human rights tribunals do not deserve deference when interpreting those provisions in human rights statutes that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole. Perhaps they should be afforded such deference. Indeed, perhaps they should be afforded it in the employment context, which forms an important part of their caseload. But this is quite beside the point. What I am arguing is that the refusal of the jurisprudence as it now stands to show deference to human rights tribunals is not a good reason for refusing to defer to labour arbitrators on similar questions. In any event, in determining the appropriate standard of review, arbitral expertise in human rights matters should first and foremost be understood in relation to the expertise of the reviewing court, and not to that of human rights tribunals.
77
When we consider the complexity of unionized work environments, it becomes apparent that arbitrators may have more expertise than the courts in interpreting human rights statutes in the employment context. Consider a situation in which an arbitrator must determine whether an employee who is the subject of prima facie discrimination can be accommodated without imposing undue hardship. In many workplaces there is more than one bargaining unit, each with its own collective agreement. Accommodating the employee might require her to be transferred into a position in another bargaining unit. This in turn would require establishing her seniority in the new unit, which could affect other workers, perhaps resulting in a layoff. Many parties might suffer some hardship, at least two collective agreements would have to be analyzed, and the consequences for the ongoing working relationship between the union(s) and the employer might be significant. 78 Even though the issue in this case could easily be framed as a purely legal question, 79 deciding such a matter needs an in-depth understanding of labour relations. In this sort 77 Indeed, expertise is not determinative in tracing the jurisdictional boundaries between these two tribunals. See Parry Sound, supra note 1 at 54; Morin, supra note 57 at para 72, Bastarache J dissenting. 78 The complex interaction between accommodation claims and seniority is discussed in Christian decisions on general questions of law ought to be shown deference if they are "closely connected" to the "core" jurisdiction with respect to which they have a high level of expertise.
82
This is similar to the position advanced in Dunsmuir in a separate concurring opinion by Justice Binnie, who suggested that deference should be shown toward an administrative tribunal's interpretation not only of its enabling statute, but also of "closely related" statutes. Justice Binnie said: "It should be sufficient to frame a rule exempting from the correctness standard the provisions of the home statute and closely related statutes which require the expertise of the administrative decision maker (as in the labour board example)."
83
Another advantage of applying the reasonableness standard rather than the correctness standard to arbitrators' interpretation of human rights legislation is that it would solve a problem that arises when the terms of these statutes are explicitly incorporated into a collective agreement.
accommodation cases] the separation between the legal and the factual, and between legal questions that lie at the heart of an arbitrator's mandate and those that do not, are not straightforward matters."). 80 See Council of Canadians with Disabilities v VIA Rail Canada, 2007 SCC 15 at paras 96-97, [2007 1 SCR 650 (decisions of administrative agencies are not reviewable on a correctness standard simply because they include a "human rights aspect"). 81 Supra note 48. 82 Ibid at paras 72-74 (questions of general law are often intertwined with labour law issues, and adjudicators should be accorded deference when these questions are connected to their core area of expertise). See also Nor-Man, supra note 8 at paras 32-34, 38 (arbitral awards that give common law or equitable remedies should not, for that reason alone, be subject to review on a standard of correctness). 83 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 128. Binnie J also stated that "[l]abour arbitrators, as in this case, command deference on legal matters within their enabling statute or on legal matters intimately connected thereto." Ibid at para 147.
The problem in such cases is that a reviewing court is faced with the apparent application of two different standards of review to the interpretation of a single normative text, and has no principled way to decide which standard to apply.
There are many reasons why unions and employers choose to explicitly incorporate human rights language into their collective agreements. Before Parry Sound, this strategy provided an assurance that an arbitrator would have jurisdiction over human rights claims originating in the workplace. Thus the parties to a collective agreement containing such language could be certain that someone who understood the labour relations context could decide disputes with a human rights dimension. Furthermore, since an arbitral interpretation of the terms of a collective agreement is deferred to by the courts, the parties to a collective agreement containing human rights language had some assurance that an eventual decision would be final and binding, rather than get bogged down in judicial review proceedings.
However, in such cases the jurisprudence gives no clear answer as to how courts should approach the judicial review of an arbitral decision on the human rights language in question.
Since that language is in the collective agreement, an arbitral interpretation of it would normally command deference. On the other hand, if the language was not put into the collective agreement, the arbitrator would still be obliged to interpret it because it was part of the human rights statute -but an arbitral interpretation of a human rights statute is usually reviewed on the correctness standard, since those statutes are of central importance to the legal system as a whole.
The Supreme Court has been confronted twice with collective agreements that incorporate language from human rights statutes, but has failed to settle the matter. 84 In Green Bay, Justice
Major, for the majority of the Court, asserted that two standards of review applied:
In the present appeal, both the "patently unreasonable" and the "correctness" standards of review are involved. The Board interpreted the collective agreement and the [Human Rights] Code. If the Board was incorrect but not patently unreasonable in all of its findings, the Court can only interfere on the "correctness" standard with those portions of the decision that as questions of law interpret the Code. 85 Here, Justice Major begged the question, as he did not directly address what would happen if the collective agreement used exactly the same language as the human rights statute. 86 If, as I suggest, the standard of review were to be the same in each case, the problem would disappear.
Having the same standard of review would also be in keeping with the objective of having a single standard applicable to the whole decision, rather than applying different standards to different aspects of it.
87
Parry Sound did not resolve this problem; if anything, it exacerbated it. In that case, the Court held that "the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code are incorporated into each collective agreement over which an arbitrator has jurisdiction." 88 Thus,
where the parties have explicitly included human rights language in the collective agreement, the arbitrator's interpretation would be subject to review on the reasonableness standard, but where statutory human rights protections are merely "incorporated" into the agreement, the applicable standard of review would still be correctness.
(d) Acquiring Expertise
If courts are to show deference to arbitrators' interpretation of human rights legislation, it must be in recognition of arbitral expertise. Since the case law to date has not recognized arbitrators as experts in human rights, courts could not show such deference without acknowledging that an arbitrator has acquired the necessary expertise.
85 Green Bay, ibid at para 14. Given the demise of the patently unreasonableness standard in Dunsmuir, the effect of this statement now would result in the application of the reasonableness standard. 86 In Green Bay, ibid, the parties had included language prohibiting discrimination, but had not provided for the "bona fide occupational requirement" defence against prima facie discrimination. At issue was whether the arbitrator was right in allowing the employer to raise that defence. 87 Rogers Communications, supra note 43 at paras 78-87. 88 Supra note 1 at paras 23, 55. 89 The adjective "substantive" implies that it is the "rights and obligations," not the language of the Code, that are ultimately "incorporated" into collective agreements. If that is the case, an arbitrator's interpretation of these rights and obligations cannot be understood to be synonymous with interpretation of the language of the agreement. 
OBJECTIONS TO APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD TO ARBITRAL DECISIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
Giving deference to arbitral interpretations of human rights legislation is open to several objections. Here, I address the three objections that I take to be the most serious.
(a) The "Rule of Law" Objection
The first objection is that human rights statutes are so fundamental to our conception of a just society that we cannot countenance their incorrect interpretation and application by an administrative tribunal. Deference requires that a reasonable but (in a judge's opinion) wrong interpretation must stand. Would this not violate the rule of law?
One answer to this objection is that it is misleading to characterize as wrong a reasonable interpretation with which a court disagrees. A judge is simply not as well-placed as an arbitrator to determine the "correct" application of a human rights statute in the employment context; this is the whole point of deferring to expertise. In his concurring opinion in Dunsmuir, Justice Binnie made the point clearly:
It is sometimes said by judges that an administrator acting within his or her discretion "has the right to be wrong." This reflects an unduly court-centred view of the universe.
A disagreement between the court and an administrator does not necessarily mean that the administrator is wrong. 97 The possibility that unions might use their control of grievances to insulate discriminatory clauses of a collective agreement from oversight was an important reason for recognizing the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals over the collective agreement negotiation process. Morin, supra note 57 at para 28.
My reply to this "individual rights" objection is that it simply has nothing to do with the standard of review of arbitration decisions. Rather, it is an objection to the jurisdiction of arbitrators to interpret and apply human rights statutes. The current state of the law is such that a unionized employee who does not want to have her employment-related human rights complaint dealt with in arbitration may often take that complaint to the human rights forum, as long as it is not also pursued in arbitration. 98 The argument for deference to arbitrators does not in any way suggest that they ought to have exclusive jurisdiction over human rights claims, but merely that once they exercise their concurrent jurisdiction, their awards should be reviewable only on a reasonableness standard.
If the "individual rights" objection had any merit, it would also hold for the adjudication of all kinds of other, non-human-rights claims that unionized employees might wish to bringand it clearly does not hold for other kinds of claims. In those cases, the arbitrator's jurisdiction really is exclusive, and an arbitral award will be shown a high level of deference by the courts.
Insofar as this objection is particular to human rights claims, it is just a version of the "rule of law" objection.
CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that labour arbitrators are now sufficiently expert in the interpretation of human rights legislation that they should be accorded deference in this area by reviewing judges.
How judges could apprehend this evolution in expertise in the context of determining the applicable standard of review is not entirely clear. functional" approach has done little to bring the law down to earth. This is true of the determination of tribunal expertise as well as the role of such expertise in the courts' selection of the appropriate standard of review.
The distinction between the expertise of individual adjudicators and the institutional expertise of tribunals is helpful in understanding the nature of expertise, and so is the distinction between a tribunal's expertise and its specialized role. However, the courts are likely to use these distinctions only obliquely, since determination of expertise is ultimately not a matter of fact but of (legal) fiction.
Keeping this in mind, we are not without tools to apprehend evolving expertise. First, legislators could explicitly set out what they see as the level of expertise of a tribunal in its enabling statute, as the British Columbia Administrative Tribunals Act does, although it remains to be seen whether dictating the resulting standard of review would pass section 96 muster on a direct challenge. 100 Second, courts could take judicial notice of acquired expertise by adjusting the range of statutes that are "closely related" or "intimately connected" to a given tribunal's enabling act. Finally, in the particular case of labour arbitration, the role that the parties to a collective agreement play in selecting an adjudicator and determining her jurisdiction allows them to signal to the courts, explicitly or implicitly, the matters in which they understand the arbitrator to be an expert.
100 See Crevier, supra note 39. Figliola, supra note 29 and Moore, supra note 29 are not determinative of this issue. On one hand, the Supreme Court's application of the B.C. ATA, supra note 29, ss 58-59, could be seen as an endorsement of its constitutionality. On the other hand, the absence of any real standard of review analysis may signal the Court's unwillingness to consider the relationship between the ATA and the general law of judicial review until the question is squarely raised. The Court also skirted the question in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010 2 SCR 650, deciding that a mixed question of law and fact falls between the two standards provided for by the ATA (correctness and patent unreasonableness) and that, in such cases, the reasonableness standard set out in Dunsmuir, ibid, applies.
